Do you even need quantum mechanics to make that argument, then? You’re basically saying weak emergence is evidence of being in a simulation because you can approximate nature much simpler when “zoomed out.” It seems like even if we did not have quantum mechanics you could still make that argument.
Why would an optimization make things more complicated? The point of optimizations in any simulation is to simplify the complexity of the computation. The entire reason why there is a multi-billionaire industry to research quantum computers is because they are exponentially more difficult to simulate than classical physics, so they are not practical to simulate on a classical computer. Seems weird to me that a simulator would “optimize” things by making them enormously more complex.
That’s not how political parties work, though. Political parties are largely ideological institutions, they exist first and foremost not to win elections but to propagate an ideology, and winning the election is just a sign that they succeeded in their goal of convincing people of their ideology, and so now enough people agree that it can take root in the state. When political parties lose, it’s very rare that they will interpret their loss as “we need to abandon all our values to match the opinion polls.” No, they interpret their loss as meaning they failed in their goal of convincing people of their values, and thus should change their strategy of their out-reach, not changing their whole ideological position.
Democrats going against the rich elites would be an abandonment of their party’s values and everything they stand for. In most countries, if you dislike the ideology of a party, you vote for someone else. The party itself has no obligation to change its entire ideology for you, such a thing very rarely occurs. If that was the case, then every political party would all have the exact same position, just all copy/pastes of whatever the opinion polls say.
I keep seeing all this bizarre rhetoric about how if the Democrats were “smart” they would just abandon their whole party’s platform and adopt some other platform, but this makes zero sense, because you have to consider motivation. Their motivation is not to just win the election, but to convince you of their ideology, and abandoning their ideology does not achieve this. Democrats are not stupid, they just don’t have the same motivations as you. Yes, they want to win, but they ultimately want to win on their platform, not on someone else’s platform.
That’s how political parties work. They have a platform, and the platform is paramount. If a green party adopted all pro-coal and pro-oil lobby positions just to win an election, that would not be a “smart” decision for them, because, even if it leads to their victory, it still is an abandonment of their ideology. Democrats are unabashedly a pro-rich elite party, it should not be smart for them to become anti-elite, because it is not aligned with their motivations.
Yes, it’s ultimately a cautionary tale as to why social democracy is unsustainable, as it is just the implementation of social policies while maintaining capitalist hegemony. There is no such thing as a benevolent oligarch. Capitalists have utilitarian reasons to implement pro-worker social policies, and it’s usually to reduce unrest or increase productivity. The moment those reasons no longer become relevant, they will begin to dismantle it. Much of western Europe in general right now is suffering from nonstop austerity for a long time now.
Bell’s theorem demonstrates that you cannot have a deterministic theory that would also be Lorentz invariant, that is to say, compatible with special relativity and the speed of light limit. The speed of light limit is very well tested over and over again, and no one to this day has ever been able to construct even a single mathematical model that could even approximately reconstruct the predictions of quantum field theory in a way that is deterministic. That suggests that any deterministic theory would actually make quantifiably different predictions than quantum field theory, and yet we don’t have any evidence that its predictions are violated, and quantum field theory is verified to 12 decimal places of precision.
I don’t really understand your point about the dice. If you have two “quantum” dice that are exactly the same, they are not guaranteed to land on the same thing, and that is precisely what it means to be nondeterministic, that even if all the initial conditions are the same, the outcome can be different. Yes, we cannot make the whole universe the same throughout the experiment, but to make sense of this, you cannot speak in vague philosophy but need to actually specify in mathematical terms what parts of the universe you think are determining the outcome, which, again, any attempt to specify such a thing would require contradicting the predictions of quantum field theory.
My issue with your argument is that, whether or not you intended this or not, what you are undeniably arguing is that all our current physical theories are currently wrong and making the wrong predictions, and they need to be adjusted to make the right predictions, and you are basing this off of what is ultimately a philosophical criticism, i.e. that it is not deterministic and you think it should be, without even having a viable model of what this determinism would look like. It just seems far too speculative to me.
Yes, you can always make the argument that “our old theories have been proven wrong before, like Newton’s gravity was replaced with Einstein’s gravity, so we shouldn’t put much stock into our current theories,” but I just find this unconvincing, as you can make this argument in literally any era, and thus it completely negates the possibility of using science to understand the properties of nature. Every scientific theory would have to always be interpreted as just something tentative that can’t tell us anything about nature, because it’s bound to be replaced later, and instead we’re just left arguing vague philosophy not based on anything empirical.
I will readily admit that if I base my understanding of reality on our best physical sciences of the era, those can be overturned and I could be shown to be wrong. However, I still find it to be the most reasonable position as opposed to trying to “intuit” our way to an understanding of nature. The person who strongly defended the Newtonian picture of nature prior to Einstein was later shown to be wrong, yes, but he was still far more correct than the majority of those who insisted upon trying to derive an understanding of nature entirely from intuition/philosophy. I am with Heisenberg who argued that until we actually have any experimental evidence that violates the predictions of quantum field theory and can only be corrected with the introduction of hidden variables, then positing their existence is pointless metaphysical speculation, not derived from anything empirical.
This is accurate, yes. The cat in the box is conscious presumably, in my opinion of cats at least, but still can be “not an observer” from the POV of the scientist observing the experiment from outside the box.
“Consciousness” is not relevant here at all. You can write down the wave function of a system relative to a rock if you wanted, in a comparable way as writing down the velocity of a train from the “point of view” of a rock. It is coordinate. It has nothing to do with “consciousness.” The cat would perceive a definite state of the system from its reference frame, but the person outside the box would not until they interact with it.
QM is about quite a lot more than coordinate systems
Obviously QM is not just coordinate systems. The coordinate nature of quantum mechanics, the relative nature of it, is merely a property of the theory and not the whole theory. But the rest of the theory does not have any relevance to “consciousness.”
and in my opinion will make it look weird in retrospect once physics expands to a more coherent whole
The theory is fully coherent and internally consistent. It amazes me how many people choose to deny QM and always want to rush to change it. Your philosophy should be guided by the physical sciences, not the other way around. People see QM going against their basic intuitions and their first thought is it must be incomplete and needs to have additional complexity added to it to make it fit their intuitions, rather than just questioning that maybe their basic intuitions are wrong.
Your other comment was to a Wikipedia page which if you clicked the link on your own source it would’ve told you that the scientific consensus on that topic is that what you’re presenting is a misinterpretation.
A simple search on YouTube could’ve also brought up several videos explaining this to you.
Edit: Placing my response here as an edit since I don’t care to continue this conversation so I don’t want to notify.
Yes, that was what I said. Er, well… QM, as I understand it, doesn’t have to do anything with shifting coordinate systems per se (and in fact is still incompatible with relativity). They’re just sort of similar in that they both have to define some point of view and make everything else in the model relative to it. I’m still not sure why you brought coordinate systems into it.
A point of view is just a colloquial term to refer to a coordinate system. They are not coordinate in the exact same way but they are both coordinate.
My point was that communication of state to the observer in the system, or not, causes a difference in the outcome. And that from the general intuitions that drive almost all of the rest of physics, that’s weird and sort of should be impossible.
No, it doesn’t not, and you’re never demonstrated that.
Sure. How is it when combined with macro-scale intuition about the way natural laws work, or with general relativity?
We have never observed quantum effects on the scale where gravitational effects would also be observable, so such a theory, if we proposed one, would not be based on empirical evidence.
This is very, very very much not what I am doing. What did I say that gave you the impression I was adding anything to it?
You literally said in your own words we need to take additional things into account we currently are not. You’re now just doing a 180 and pretending you did not say what literally anyone can scroll up and see that you said.
I am not talking about anything about retrocausality here, except maybe accidentally.
Then you don’t understand the experiment since the only reason it is considered interesting is because if you interpret it in certain ways it seems to imply retrocausality. Literally no one has ever treated it as anything more than that. You are just making up your own wild implications from the experiment.
I was emphasizing the second paragraph; “wave behavior can be restored by erasing or otherwise making permanently unavailable the ‘which path’ information.”
The behavior of the system physically changes when it undergoes a physical interaction. How surprising!
There is “observer-dependence” in quantum mechanics in a comparable way that there is observer-dependence in general relativity. It has nothing to do with some “fundamental role of consciousness” but comes from the fact that reality itself depends on how you look at it, it is reference frame dependent. The “observer” is just a chosen coordinate system in which to describe other things. I know, you probably got this from Kastrup too, right? Idealists have been getting desperate and resorting to quantum woo, pretending that something that changes based on coordinate system proves fundamental consciousnesses.
Kastrup is entirely unconvincing because he pretends the only two schools of philosophy in the whole universe are his specific idealism and metaphysical realism which he falsely calls the latter “materialism.” He thus never feels the need to ever address anything outside of a critique of a single Laymen understanding of materialism which is more popular in western countries than eastern countries, ignoring the actual wealth of philosophical literature.
Anyone who actually reads books on philosophy would inevitably find Kastrup to be incredibly unconvincing as he, by focusing primarily on a single school, never justifies many of his premises. He begins from the very beginning talking about “conscious experience” and whatnot when, if you’re not a metaphysical realist, that is what you are supposed to be arguing in the first place. Unless you’re already a dualist or metaphysical realist, if you are pretty much any other philosophical school like contextual realist, dialectical materialist, empiriomonist, etc, you probably already view reality as inherently observable, and thus perception is just reality from a particular point-of-view. It then becomes invalid to add qualifiers to it like “conscious experience” or “subjective experience” as reality itself cannot had qualifiers.
I mean, the whole notion of “subjective experience” goes back to Nagel who was a metaphysical realist through-and-through and wrote a whole paper defending that notion, “What is it like to be a Bat?”, and this is what Kastrup assumes his audience already agrees with from the get-go. He never addresses any of the criticisms of metaphysical realism but pretends like they don’t exist and he is the unique sole critic of it and constantly calls metaphysical realism “materialism” as if they’re the same philosophy at all. He then builds all of his arguments off of this premise.
Classical computers compute using 0s and 1s which refer to something physical like voltage levels of 0v or 3.3v respectively. Quantum computers also compute using 0s and 1s that also refers to something physical, like the spin of an electron which can only be up or down. Although these qubits differ because with a classical bit, there is just one thing to “look at” (called “observables”) if you want to know its value. If I want to know the voltage level is 0 or 1 I can just take out my multimeter and check. There is just one single observable.
With a qubit, there are actually three observables: σx, σy, and σz. You can think of a qubit like a sphere where you can measure it along its x, y, or z axis. These often correspond in real life to real rotations, for example, you can measure electron spin using something called Stern-Gerlach apparatus and you can measure a different axis by physically rotating the whole apparatus.
How can a single 0 or 1 be associated with three different observables? Well, the qubit can only have a single 0 or 1 at a time, so, let’s say, you measure its value on the z-axis, so you measure σz, and you get 0 or 1, then the qubit ceases to have values for σx or σy. They just don’t exist anymore. If you then go measure, let’s say, σx, then you will get something entirely random, and then the value for σz will cease to exist. So it can only hold one bit of information at a time, but measuring it on a different axis will “interfere” with that information.
It’s thus not possible to actually know the values for all the different observables because only one exists at a time, but you can also use them in logic gates where one depends on an axis with no value. For example, if you measure a qubit on the σz axis, you can then pass it through a logic gate where it will flip a second qubit or not flip it because on whether or not σx is 0 or 1. Of course, if you measured σz, then σx has no value, so you can’t say whether or not it will flip the other qubit, but you can say that they would be correlated with one another (if σx is 0 then it will not flip it, if it is 1 then it will, and thus they are related to one another). This is basically what entanglement is.
Because you cannot know the outcome when you have certain interactions like this, you can only model the system probabilistically based on the information you do know, and because measuring qubits on one axis erases its value on all others, then some information you know about the system can interfere with (cancel out) other information you know about it. Waves also can interfere with each other, and so oddly enough, it turns out you can model how your predictions of the system evolve over the computation using a wave function which then can be used to derive a probability distribution of the results.
What is even more interesting is that if you have a system like this where you have to model it using a wave function, it turns out it can in principle execute certain algorithms exponentially faster than classical computers. So they are definitely nowhere near the same as classical computers. Their complexity scales up exponentially when trying to simulate quantum computers on a classical computer. Every additional qubit doubles the complexity, and thus it becomes really difficult to even simulate small numbers of qubits. I built my own simulator in C and it uses 45 gigabytes of RAM to simulate just 16. I think the world record is literally only like 56.
I feel like there is a pretty big gap between understanding how logic gates and truth tables work and understanding the underlying physics of how modern processors work.
Even if you believe there really exists a “hard problem of consciousness,” even Chalmers admits such a thing would have to be fundamentally unobservable and indistinguishable from something that does not have it (see his p-zombie argument), so it could never be something discovered by the sciences, or something discovered at all. Believing there is something immaterial about consciousness inherently requires an a priori assumption and cannot be something derived from a posteriori observational evidence.
We feel conscious and have an internal experience
It does not make sense to add the qualifier “internal” unless it is being contrasted with “external.” It makes no sense to say “I’m inside this house” unless you’re contrasting it with “as opposed to outside the house.” Speaking of “internal experience” is a bit odd in my view because it implies there is such thing as an “external experience”. What would that even be?
What about the p-zombie, the human person who just doesn’t have an internal experience and just had a set of rules, but acts like every other human?
The p-zombie argument doesn’t make sense as you can only conceive of things that are remixes of what you’ve seen before. I have never seen a pink elephant but I’ve seen pink things and I’ve seen elephants so I can remix them in my mind and imagine it. But if you ask me to imagine an elephant a color I’ve never seen before? I just can’t do it, I wouldn’t even know what that means. Indeed, a person blind since birth cannot “see” at all, not in their imagination, not even in their dreams.
The p-zombie argument asks us to conceive of two people that are not observably different in every way yet still different because one is lacking some property that the other has. But if you’re claiming you can conceive of this, I just don’t believe you. You’re probably playing some mental tricks on yourself to make you think you can conceive of it but you cannot. If there is nothing observably different about them then there is nothing conceivably different about them either.
What about a cat, who apparently has a less complex internal experience, but seems to act like we’d expect if it has something like that? What about a tick, or a louse? What about a water bear? A tree? A paramecium? A bacteria? A computer program?
This is what Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers ask and then settles on “mammals only” because they have an unjustified mammalian bias. Like I said, there is no “internal” experience, there is just experience. Nagel and Chalmers both rely on an unjustified premise that “point-of-view” is unique to mammalian brains because supposedly objective reality is point-of-view independent and since experience clearly has an aspect of point-of-view then that means experience too must be a product purely of mammalian brains, and then demands the “physicalists” prove how non-experiential reality gives rise to the experiential realm.
But the entire premise is arbitrary and wrong. Objective reality is not point-of-view independent. In general relativity, reality literally change depending on your point-of-view. Time passes a bit faster for people standing up than people sitting down, lengths of rulers can change between observers, velocity of objects can change as well. Relational quantum mechanics goes even further and shows that all variable properties of particles depend upon point-of-view.
The idea that objective reality is point-of-view independent is just entirely false. It is point-of-view dependent all the way down. Experience is just objective reality as it actually exists independent of the observer but dependent upon the point-of-view in which they occupy. It has nothing to do with mammalian brains, “consciousness,” or subjectivity. If reality is point-of-view dependent all the way down, then it is not even possible to conceive of an intelligent being that would occupy a unique point-of-view, because everything occupies their own unique point-of-view, even a rock. It’s not a byproduct of the “conscious mind” but just a property of objective reality: experience is objective reality independent of the observer, but dependent upon the context of that experience.
There’s a continuum one could construct that includes all those things and ranks them by how similar their behaviors are to ours, and calls the things close to us conscious and the things farther away not, but the line is ever going to be fuzzy. There’s no categorical difference that separates one end of the spectrum from the other, it’s just about picking where to put the line.
When you go down this continuum what gradually disappears is cognition, that is to say, the ability to think about, reflect upon, be self-aware of, one’s point-of-view. The point-of-viewness of reality, or more simply the contextual nature of reality, does not disappear at any point. Only the ability to talk about it disappears. A rock cannot tell you anything about what it’s like to be a rock from its context, it has no ability to reflect upon the point-of-view it occupies.
Although you’re right there is no hard-and-fast line for cognition, but that’s true of anything in nature. There’s no hard-and-fast line for anything. Take a cat for example, where does the cat begin and end, both in space in time? Create a rigorous definition of its borders. You won’t be able to do it. All our conceptions are human creations and therefore a bit fuzzy. Reality is infinitely complex and we cannot deal with the infinite complexity all at once so we break it up into chunks that are easier to work with: cats, dogs, trees, red, blue, hydrogen, helium, etc. But you always find when you look at these things a little more closely that their nature as discrete “things” becomes rather fuzzy and disappears.
You should look into contextual realism. You might find it interesting. It is a philosophical school from the philosopher Jocelyn Benoist that basically argues that the best way to solve most of the major philosophical problems and paradoxes (i.e. mind-body problem) is to presume the natural world is context variant all the way down, i.e. there simply is no reality independent of specifying some sort of context under which it is described (kind of like a reference frame).
The physicist Francois-Igor Pris points out that if you apply this thinking to quantum mechanics, then the confusion around interpreting it entirely disappears, because the wave function clearly just becomes a way of accounting for the context under which an observer is observing a system, and that value definiteness is just a context variant property, i.e. two people occupying two different contexts will not always describe the system as having the same definite values, but may describe some as indefinite which the other person describes as definite.
“Observation” is just an interaction, and by interacting with a system you are by definition changing your context, and thus you have to change your accounting for your context (i.e. the wave function) in order to make future predictions. Updating the wave function then just becomes like taring a scale, that is to say, it is like re-centering or “zeroing” your coordinate system, and isn’t “collapsing” anything physical. There is no observer-dependence in the sense that observers are somehow fundamental to nature, only that systems depend upon context and so naturally as an observer describing a system you have to take this into account.
Quantum mechanics is incompatible with general relativity, it is perfectly compatible with special relativity, however. I mean, that is literally what quantum field theory is, the unification of special relativity and quantum mechanics into a single framework. You can indeed integrate all aspects of relativity into quantum mechanics just fine except for gravity. It’s more that quantum mechanics is incompatible with gravity and less that it is incompatible with relativity, as all the other aspects we associate with relativity are still part of quantum field theory, like the passage of time being relative, relativity of simultaneity, length contraction, etc.
well IBM does have cloud accessible quantum computers that they don’t charge to use
I used those to teach myself some stuff about quantum information science
You shouldn’t take it that seriously. MWI has a lot of zealots in the popular media who act like it’s a proven fact, kind of like some String Theorists do, but it is actually rather dubious.
MWI claims it is simpler because they are getting rid of the Born rule, so it has less assumptions, but the reason there is the Born rule in QM is because… well, it’s needed to actually predict the right results. You can’t just throw it out. It’s also impossible to derive the Born rule without some sort of additional assumption, and there is no agreed upon way to do this.[1]
This makes MWI actually more complicated than traditional quantum mechanics because they have to add different arbitrary assumptions and then add an additional layer of mathematics to derive the Born rule from it, rather than assuming it. These derivations also tend to be incredibly arbitrary because the assumptions you have to make to derive it are always chosen specifically for the purpose of deriving the Born rule and don’t seem to make much sense otherwise, and thus are just as arbitrary as assuming the Born rule directly.[2] [3]
If you prefer a video, the one below discusses various “multiverse” ideas including MWI and also discusses how it ultimately ends up being more mathematically complicated than other interpretations of QM.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHa1vbwVaNU
MWI also makes no sense for a separate reason. If you consider the electromagnetic field for example, how do we know it exists? We know it exists because we can see its effect on particles. If you drop some iron filings around a magnet, it conforms to the shape of a field, but ultimately what you are seeing is the iron filings and not the field itself, but the effects of the field. Now, imagine if someone claimed the iron filings don’t even exist, only the field. You’d be a bit confused because, well, you only know the field exists because of its effects on the filings. You can’t see the field, only the particles, so if you deny the particles, then you’re just left in confusion.
This is effectively what MWI does. We live in a world composed of spacetime containing particles, yet wave functions describe, well, waves made of nothing that exist in an abstract space known as Hilbert space. Schrodinger’s derivation of his famous wave equation is based on observing the behavior of particles. MWI denies particles even exist and everything is just waves in Hilbert space made of nothing, which is very bizarre because then you would be effectively claiming the entire universe is composed of something entirely invisible. So how does that explain everything we see?
[I]t does not account, per se, for the phenomenological reality that we actually observe. In order to describe the phenomena that we observe, other mathematical elements are needed besides ψ: the individual variables, like X and P, that we use to describe the world. The Many Worlds interpretation does not explain them clearly. It is not enough to know the ψ wave and Schrödinger’s equation in order to define and use quantum theory: we need to specify an algebra of observables, otherwise we cannot calculate anything and there is no relation with the phenomena of our experience. The role of this algebra of observables, which is extremely clear in other interpretations, is not at all clear in the Many Worlds interpretation.
--- Carlo Rovelli, Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution
The philosopher Tim Maudlin has a whole lecture you can watch below on this problem, pointing out how MWI makes no sense because nothing in the interpretation includes anything we can actually observe. It quite literally describes a whole universe without observables.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=us7gbWWPUsA
Not to rain on your parade or anything if you are just having fun, but there is a lot of misinformation on websites like YouTube painting MWI as more reasonable than it actually is, so I just want people to be aware.
The traditional notion of cause and effect is not something all philosophers even agree upon, I mean many materialist philosophers largely rejected the notion of simple cause-and-effect chains that go back to the “first cause” since the 1800s, and that idea is still pretty popular in some eastern countries.
For example, in China they teach “dialectical materialist” philosophy part of required “common core” in universities for any degree, and that philosophical school sees cause and effect as in a sense dependent upon point of view, that an effect being described as a particular cause is just a way of looking at things, and the same relationship under a different point of view may in fact reverse what is considered the cause and the effect, viewing the effect as the cause and vice-versa. Other points of view may even ascribe entirely different things as the cause.
It has a very holistic view of the material world so there really is no single cause to any effect, so what you choose to identify as the cause is more of a label placed by an individual based on causes that are relevant to them and not necessarily because those are truly the only causes. In a more holistic view of nature, Laplacian-style determinism doesn’t even make sense because it implies nature is reducible down to separable causes which can all be isolated from the rest and their properties can then be fully accounted for, allowing one to predict the future with certainty.
However, in a more holistic view of nature, it makes no sense to speak of the universe being reducible to separable causes as, again, what we label as causes are human constructs and the universe is not actually separable. In fact, the physicists Dmitry Blokhintsev had written a paper in response to a paper Albert Einstein wrote criticizing Einstein’s distaste for quantum mechanics as based on his adherence to the notion of separability which stems from Newtonian and Kantian philosophy, something which dialectical materialists, which Blokhintsev self-identified as, had rejected on philosophical grounds.
He wrote this paper many many years prior to the publication of Bell’s theorem which showed that giving up on separability (and by extension absolute determinism) really is a necessity in quantum mechanics. Blokhintsev would then go on to write a whole book called The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics where in it he argues that separability in nature is an illusion and under a more holistic picture absolute determinism makes no sense, again, purely from materialistic grounds.
The point I’m making is ultimately just that a lot of the properties people try to ascribe to “materialists” or “naturalists” which then later try to show quantum mechanics is in contradiction with, they seem to forget that these are large umbrella philosophies with many different sects and there have been materialist philosophers criticizing absolute determinism as even being a meaningful concept since at least the 1800s.
So many skibidi vibes here man, it was all vibes rizzing up this place and until I came and unvibed everything. The vibes are so joever vro I was just mogged. 😔