Oh, lovely.

Bitwarden hasn’t steered me wrong yet.

Yes, because nobody has ever believed themselves to be superior for reasons other than religion such as ethnicity; that would be absurd. It’s not like the Jews suffered a holocaust for exactly that reason or something.

(To be absolutely clear: this isn’t a defense of Israel; they are, beyond any possible doubt, perpetrating a genocide, and I don’t want it to seem like I’m excusing this in any way because there is no defense. I just want to note that this is a flaw in humanity that we see pop up in a variety of forms, with religion being one possible angle.)

To call this a flaw in religion is to equivocate Israel to Judaism, and that’s exactly what Israel wants you to do. Don’t help them muddy the waters.

The real risk they should be worried about is the resource commitment required to run a nuclear program in the first place (to say nothing of their ballistic missiles which have consumed incredible resources over time only for them to have underperformed in the Twelve Day War).

Their domestic situation remains incredibly fragile, and every bit of money committed to a war machine is money that can’t be committed to domestic priorities like keeping the people from wanting to forcefully interface you with a piece of lighting infrastructure Mussolini-style.

Ukraine deploying drones from trucks in Operation Spiderweb was arguably also a drone carrier, just a terrestrial one.

If I’m understanding what you mean correctly, then that is the point that Japan started building up its military again. The war in Ukraine was a shock to the system for many countries, and Japan was no exception. Their subsequent 2023 force design white paper outlined a whole host of ways that they intended to expand and modernize the force in order to better handle a potential fight if the “rules-based international order” (their words) were to continue its trajectory of instability.

Still, your point stands, as to my understanding, they remain deeply dependent on INDOPACOM for coordination a lot of the time. For example: South Korea is by far one of their best options as regional allies go, but those two haven’t really been able to put aside the hate for each other very effectively. They’re explicitly allied, but most Asia Pacific training operations involving Korea and Japan are configured with the US as the glue holding them together. I, for one, wouldn’t trust that glue to keep holding.

Sorry I’m late, but is this even true, though? My understanding is that their population is only endangered due to human mass deforestation, and that the reproductive difficulties we see with Pandas are specific to captivity.

It’s not that they’re not trying to exist, it’s just that we took away their natural environments and they’re just not made for an artificial environment. There are plenty of animals that can’t live/reproduce in captivity, and it’s not because they’re not trying.

Idk, I’m not an expert on Pandas, but imo it feels incredibly arrogant for us to decimate their habitats, imprison them in artificial environments, blame them for being unable to adapt to the conditions that we inflicted on them, and then allow them to die as if that was somehow their desire or predetermined end.

Asymmetric warfare is the name of the game, and you are correct in that Ukraine’s creative implementation of low-cost, accessible technology to generate combat power is something which any force fighting an asymmetric war should seek to emulate. Drones are a fantastic resource for equalizing a resource/materiel disparity and filling capability gaps, as we have learned. Unfortunately, though, looking at the way that Ukraine is fighting their war currently is not likely to be as helpful as looking at the way that Ukrainians were preparing to fight this war.

As it stands, the war in Ukraine turned out to be much closer to a peer conflict than the absolute overmatch that was anticipated, so the type of fighting we see now became an option. Before Feb. 2022, however, the focus was much more on providing civilians and irregulars with the arms and resources needed to become persistent thorns in the side of an occupying force. That is, rather than preparing to fight a war, focus was on preparing an insurgency. The US is unlikely to be atrophied in the same way as Russia, and while there are many valid criticisms which can be leveled at the US Military, the operation in Venezuela proves that the US retains the ability to coordinate a combined arms offensive in a way that Russia simply cannot.

That’s not to say it’s a guaranteed instant loss: Canada is a very large country, with many environmental advantages which skew the odds heavily away from an invading force, but I think that this is much more likely to be an overmatch than Ukraine was. If nothing else, though, the expeditionary wars in Asia and the Middle East tell us that a dedicated insurgency always wins over a long enough time frame against America.

To any Canadians (or Greenlanders, for that matter) worried about a US invasion, I would recommend the Swedish government’s In Case of Crisis or War brochure. There’s some information in there that is Sweden-specific, but it contains a lot of good information about prep and adaptation during wartime conditions. Additionally, the Simple Sabotage Field Manual by the US Office of Strategic Services remains a great resource in making yourself a more destructive nuisance to an invading force.

Also, get a gun and learn how to use it. Hopefully it just gathers dust, but in the worst case, you’ll be glad you have it. Know that if the US invades, I’ll be doing my best to be a domestic saboteur.

Probably depends on who you ask, but my understanding is that there is at least relatively significant support for the reinstatement of Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son and exiled crown prince of the last shah. To my knowledge, his calls for protest and overthrow aren’t the inciting incident for the currently-occurring protests (the economic catastrophe(s) Iran is going through have that plenty covered), but those calls to action have at least been been a contributing factor and rallying point for the ongoing protests.

Plus, without the US onside, NATO does not have the stocks at the moment to keep supplying Ukraine in the way they would need to take back all of their lost territory, and you can’t become a member of NATO if you have an ongoing border dispute. Unless Ukraine is willing to cede its claims to the regions occupied/annexed since 2022 (as well as Crimea), they can’t join NATO now, and they can’t re-take that territory (for now) without the US helping.

If defense production can adequately ramp in the rest of NATO, then that might change, but for the moment this seems like a decent option if it keeps US friendly and options open depending on how things pan out. They aren’t really sacrificing anything that was a realistic prospect in the short term anyways, as far as their strategic goals are concerned.

Fr. I died when I saw the title because it reads like a conspiracy theory class roster lmao

Apologies it took me so long to look at this - got busy irl, but that’s a fair take, and an understandable one at that. I’ve long been of the opinion that sanctions on nations like North Korea and Iran are, at this point, completely ineffectual, and are essentially just inflicting pain on the civilian populace for little gain. Past a certain threshold of sanctioning, you essentially decouple your economy from the one you’re sanctioning, and in so doing you lose any leverage you might have had. I also will make clear that I consider the US’s actions in the case of Cuba to be utterly reprehensible; that particular case is as clear cut as it gets, and is illustrative of the way that the US has historically wielded its geopolitical and economic heft with all the precision of a cudgel as part of its broader aims to impose its own (flawed) economic view of the world.

The thing that I would note, however, is that the US isn’t the only actor, and that sanctions on North Korea haven’t been continuous by other western actors. In particular, sanctions were easing to a significant degree in the 90s and early 2000s under the Agreed Framework as a consequence of Seoul pushing for normalized relations during that time. This changed, however, when North Korea first withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and then in particular tested nuclear weapons several times from 2006 onward. At that point, several western nations which had lifted sanctions re-imposed them as an attempt to discourage other actors from pursuing the same path. Now, I will admit that this is a somewhat unfair argument, as it fails to note that the US broadly did not hold up its end of the deal within the Agreed Framework, only agreeing to it in the first place on the assumption that the Kim regime would collapse before they needed to hold up their end, and Israel is similarly in violation of the NPT and hasn’t faced anything like the consequences that North Korea has, but it isn’t as if there aren’t modern reasons for the sanctions, nor is it the case that North Korea isn’t somewhat guilty here.

All that said, however, I still don’t think that the North Korean sanctions as they exist now are serving American interests, and the reason I say that is because it has pushed North Korea into alignment with Russia, as they have essentially zero to lose by doing so considering how heavily sanctioned they already are. Historically, the primary limitation of North Korean nuclear weapons is not the warhead, but actually the technical aspect of the delivery system, and North Korea’s recent collaboration with Russia may actually resolve that particular problem for them, as Russia has the industry and technical know-how to create some truly cutting edge ballistic missiles. In a certain sense, the American over-use of sanctions may, at this point, have actually become entirely self-defeating in a geostrategic sense.

Sanctions do make sense in the case of Russia, though, as they are a net positive producer in most critical civilian industries, so the populace is unlikely to go hungry regardless of sanctions, so the sanctions instead serve a primary purpose of providing an extra layer of friction in Russian imports of technical systems, increasing cost for domestic military manufacturing, and an extra layer of friction for Russian exports. One specific example is OPEC capping the price of oil at such a level that Russia is unlikely to actually make any kind of profit on such an export. This allows the global price of oil to be kept steady (and keeps the price high enough that, ideally, Russian civilians who work in the industry aren’t faced with economic pain) while simultaneously limiting how much Russia can benefit from the export of such goods. That’s not really relevant to North Korea (except, perhaps, insofar as technical imports by Russia might be used to assist in warhead delivery system development, but I’ve covered that already), but I figured I would mention it as I do believe there is a case to be made for sanctions in some scenarios, separate from the fact that the US’s overuse is, at this point, clearly not what should be aimed for. Sanctions (just like tariffs, good lord the current admin is braindead) are a tool which should be considered with a surgeon’s mindset; only used in very specific scenarios where it is both necessary and sensible, and wielded with the precision of a scalpel, and not that of a blunt instrument

Regardless, though, I’ll acknowledge that your view isn’t unfounded, and that it’s not so cut-and-dry as I had implied. Thank you for providing that study, I’ll definitely be keeping that on hand for future reference.

What a strange take this is. If you are trying to equivocate the two situations as a condemnation of Ukraine, I would note that sanctions are leveraging economic power, while conventional warfare leverages military power, and you obfuscate this difference by using the word “blockade”. It isn’t a blockade, it’s sanctions. Blockades involve military power, sanctions do not. Do I believe that the US is guilty of immense human suffering as a consequence of the usage of sanctions in international relations? Of course, and I’m equally aware of the diminishing returns of pulling such an economic lever, but between economic and military power, North Korea is under economic pressure, and Ukraine is under military pressure. Having a military government only makes sense as a solution in one of these two situations, and the situations are similarly not comparable.

If, however, I instead take you at face value, likely against my better judgement, and interpret your point instead to mean that it’s valid for North Korea not to have elections because they are also justified in martial law, then I am perhaps even more confused, because it sounds like you’re arguing for martial law because of sanctions endured by North Korea (if so, see above why this is not a justification for martial law). What confuses me, though, is why you would pick that justification in the first place. You could, for example, argue that because North Korea only has an armistice with South Korea, they technically remain still at war, and thus are reasonable for imposing a permanent state of martial law. My counterpoint would be that South Korea is, at this point, incredibly unlikely to invade for a variety of economic, political, and demographic reasons, and North Korea has already shielded itself against existential threat via nuclear weapons (their opponent’s capital is 40km from the border, Seoul can’t even get much warning, much less intercept the nukes). Regardless of sanctions, there isn’t actually that much reason that North Korea should still be devoting so many of its resources to its military, nor is there that much of a reason for martial law to still be in effect.

I would also question if you genuinely think that any kind of meritocratic process occurred in a military sense when, rather than elect a leader (reflecting a peacetime footing), or have an experienced military officer take the role (reflecting a wartime footing), leadership instead passed down through three generations of the same family. Frankly, I don’t think martial law can justify that, regardless of whether or not martial law itself is justified.

Edit: Also, if you happen to have that study showing the 500,000 figure on hand, I would actually love to take a look at it. I wouldn’t be surprised, as often it is the civilian populace who bears the burden of sanctions, but it would be good to take a look at it to see if I can get a credible number to attach to that idea.

Certainly. I don’t mean to say that Zelenskyy’s time in office has been without controversy, even after his steadfast response to the war boosted (frankly, saved) his approval. The incident with NABU and SAPO, anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine whose independence was under threat back in July of this year, is a perfect example of this. I think, however, the fact that the government backed down on that in the wake of domestic protests and international backlash is a good indicator that Ukraine isn’t a dictatorship at the moment.

As the other commenter responded, you’ll be told you’re wrong. Because you are. Presumably you’re referring to the fact that Ukraine hasn’t had an election, despite Zelenskyy’s term being over?

War. It’s war. The answer is because they’re at war. Martial law has been declared, a state of emergency, and their constitution suspends elections during such a time. If they want to keep drafting soldiers in order to fight against the war of conquest declared on them by Russia, then this cannot change.

Putin could end Zelenskyy’s term right now if he simply chose to end the war. Anyone who believes the situation is so simple as “Ukraine is a dictatorship” is not only wrong, but dangerously wrong, and likely dangerously stupid to boot.

SpaceX lifts more raw tonnage into orbit than all other agencies and private organizations combined iirc, and directly controls an ever-increasing proportion of US government space-based assets, to say nothing of Starlink. Tesla, while sales have dropped, has not really seen a corresponding sustained drop in stock price (where most of his corresponding net worth from Tesla is actually located) in the meantime, though we will see if that can be sustained long term (I, for one, hope it falls off a goddamn cliff). As for your other point, Twitter (now X) and Grok by extension are, frankly, not a major factor in his worth, when assessed next to those other factors.

Correct. When we hear concerns about a declining population, the concern (typically) isn’t that a population should always be rising, or even that it shouldn’t shrink, it’s more about the long-term economic stability of the age distribution of a population within the demographic pyramid. If your demography skews significantly older, you’re going to have fewer working age people supporting your economy and more post-retirement age people needing to be supported. This can do double damage to government revenue in particular, as they will see a simultaneous decrease in tax income and an increase in pension payouts, and this can lead to a sharp contraction in the available share of the budget for all of the other government priorities.

It’s a bit ironic in this case, as this is pretty common in developed economies, and typically the way you would offset this is via immigration, as that allows you to tailor your requirements to exactly what you need to balance your demography, and so anti-immigration sentiment is only likely to cause a more severe spiral.

I will say, as someone who personally went through the American education system, that the genocide of Native Americans is actually something that is talked about in our schooling, though really only in broad terms, with basically only the trail of tears getting a specific mention. Consequently, the scale of the atrocity is not properly conveyed, but we’re pretty much all at least generally aware. In my opinion, though, that cognitive dissonance makes us worse, not better.

The larger problem, however, is in my opinion twofold. The first is that it is often framed as something which was regrettable but ultimately inevitable “they were just in the way”. This inevitability this is often presented as a component of manifest destiny, that the “American people” (who, curiously, do not include the people who were here first) were always going to end up controlling the lands that we did (see: from sea to shining sea) and so as a result we are somehow absolved by fate. The second issue is that the way that native Americans are talked about in our education system are as something that either is or soon will be a part of history, rather than as still living groups of people who we are actively continuing to oppress and marginalize in the present.

All that is to say, rather than ignorance, we’ve chosen to believe paper-thin lies to absolve ourselves instead; arguably even worse than not knowing at all.

Regrettably, Americans come factory new without the long term memory module installed. Typical cost cutting enshittification, you know how it is.

Interesting! That’s a very reasonable view, and I hadn’t considered that problem of hybridization, but put in those terms I definitely see your point of how these are somewhat mutually incompatible. I would think, however, that energy storage and grid upgrades would, if I’m understanding correctly, also assist in solving the hybridization problem, as it brings those unpredictable generation methods closer to a stable output value, allowing for it to be more easily accounted for alongside the stable output of fission, with bursts either being handled by storage or some other generation method like conventional generators (after all, we don’t actually have to take carbon emissions to zero, simply get them below the value at which more carbon is absorbed than released). Additionally, while solar is unpredictable as a result of weather, what we can say is that it only produces power during the day, and the daytime is generally when power consumption is at its highest (not universally true, particularly in that evening/early nighttime period, but the daytime is a significant spike), so I would think that helps to some degree with the variable power output problem.

Still, I can see your point, definitely. I don’t think this reduces fission’s viability for stable generation, in particular for countries which might not have the right kind of geography for those other power generation methods to be viable, but when you have the geography of a country like the US, I’ll concede that it’s definitely not your only option, and that there are others with lower upfront cost than fission. Even this isn’t necessarily true if countries were willing to link their grids to expand the available geography, but that is unlikely to become widespread practice anytime soon due to the geostrategic risk that energy dependence like that exposes you to.

And, to your point, if we’re looking from a raw economics perspective, building a fission plant which you plan to replace with fusion in 30-50 years is actually even more expensive, because a large portion of the reactor’s operational lifespan is not being utilized and so therefore isn’t offsetting that initial upfront cost.