Microsoft is running one of the largest corporate espionage operations in modern history. Every time any of LinkedIn’s one billion users visits linkedin.com, hidden code searches their computer for installed software, collects the results, and transmits them to LinkedIn’s servers and to third-party companies including an American-Israeli cybersecurity firm. The user is never asked. Never told. LinkedIn’s privacy policy does not mention it. Because LinkedIn knows each user’s real name, employer, and job title, it is not searching anonymous visitors. It is searching identified people at identified companies. Millions of companies. Every day. All over the world.

Microsoft is running one of the largest corporate espionage operations in modern history.

Every time any of LinkedIn’s one billion users visits linkedin.com, hidden code searches their computer for installed software, collects the results, and transmits them to LinkedIn’s servers and to third-party companies including an American-Israeli cybersecurity firm.

The user is never asked. Never told. LinkedIn’s privacy policy does not mention it.

Because LinkedIn knows each user’s real name, employer, and job title, it is not searching anonymous visitors. It is searching identified people at identified companies. Millions of companies. Every day. All over the world.

  • Snot Flickerman@lemmy.blahaj.zoneEnglish
    51·
    2 hours ago

    “Yes, LinkedIn was probing for a lot of extensions, but there was no scanning of your computer and no malicious code, just a simple JavaScript technique to determine if the extension was there.”

    Reguly decided to test the resource probing and results obtained on a sample 10% of the 6,000+ extensions. “One extension refused to have its tab closed and reopened itself every time I closed it. Others changed my home screen, the about:blank page, and added bookmarks.” Another Rickrolled him, playing the ‘Never Gonna Give You Up’ video every time he opened his browser. “To say that a lot of these are the worst of the worst extensions out there is not an understatement.”

    What’s more, statistically from his sample testing, he believes only around 2,000 could be detected by LinkedIn, when even 6,000 is just a small sub-set of the total number of extensions that exist. If LinkedIn was intent on fingerprinting or profiling its users, there are better methods than this.

    “I don’t see anything that indicates malicious intent here,” he told SecurityWeek “It is discovering some information, yes, but I don’t think it crosses the threshold to malicious – I think that’s a very sensationalized view of what’s going on.”

    Asked why LinkedIn is doing this, he replies, “I don’t know. But for me, a common trend across these extensions is that they have data scraping functionality and are not well known. And they were problematic at times. Many of them gave me that used-car-salesman vibe that you see in the movies,” he continued.

    “I can’t help but wonder if LinkedIn wanted to know if these extensions were there to try and defend against them. I certainly wouldn’t want one of my LinkedIn contacts to be running these extensions and visit my page with these scrapers installed. I feel that a user with these extensions installed visiting my LinkedIn page is more of an affront to my privacy than LinkedIn checking to see if I have these extensions.”

    Of course, depending on interpretation, this still may not be appropriate or legal in the EU. However, it does seem that BrowserGate’s claims are a bit on the exaggerated side.

    OP’s link with Google’s AMP nonsense removed: https://www.securityweek.com/browsergate-claims-of-linkedin-spying-clash-with-security-research-findings/